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By considering a simple Nash bargaining solution, we analyze shoddy construction of public 
infrastructure that stems from political corruption. In our model, the business manager of a 
construction firm and the bureaucrat collude—the firm makes infrastructure with shoddy 
construction and the bureaucrat condones it by taking a bribe. We find that the size of a 
public works project, the marginal cost savings from the shoddy construction, and the 
probability of a major earthquake affect the degree of the shoddy construction. Punishment 
deters shoddy construction, but punishment that is too heavy may induce the business 
manager and the bureaucrat to escape abroad. In this case, the earthquake resistance of the 
public infrastructure decreases to a dangerously low level. 
 
JEL Classifications: D72; D73; K42 





  Until recently, public works construction has been a hotbed of political corruption.1 It is 
well known that corruption in public construction worsens economic welfare through several 
channels. According to Flyvbjerg and Molloy (2011), one typical distortion is when a 
bureaucrat overestimates the benefits of an infrastructure and underestimates the 
construction cost intentionally, and then the government builds excess infrastructure. 
Another is when a bureaucrat distorts the bidding of public purchases to create rent.2 
However, the most serious problem arising from political corruption is shoddy construction of 
public infrastructure, because such infrastructure kills a large number of people when a 
major earthquake occurs. Ambraseys and Bilham (2011), in their article published in Nature, 
reports statistical support for a correlation between corruption and loss of life in earthquakes. 
In the field of economics, Escaleras et al. (2007) and Keefer et al. (2011) also conduct more 
sophisticated statistical analysis and conclude that public sector corruption is positively 
related to earthquake deaths. 
  Reduction of earthquake resistance of infrastructure stems from collusion between 
construction firms and bureaucrats. The firm is involved in the shoddy construction of the 
infrastructure, and the bureaucrat condones it by taking a bribe. The methods of shoddy 
construction include, for example, excised steel bars, diluted concrete, and depthless piling 
these activities save construction cost and reduce quake resistance of completed public 
infrastructure. Such illicit activities are easily found by independent inspections on the 
building site; however, once the public infrastructure is finished, it is difficult to detect the 
shoddy construction. Since the reduction of earthquake resistance increases the probability 
that the public infrastructure collapses when a major earthquake occurs, shoddy construction 
raises the fatalities from an earthquake. 
  The essential problem of shoddy construction arises from collusive ties between 
construction firms and bureaucrats. Thus, considering a simple Nash bargaining solution, we 
study the earthquake resistance of public infrastructure.3 Because the shoddy construction 
                                                  
1
  For example, Hardoon and Heinrich (2011) rank 19 sectors based on a score for perceptions of foreign 
bribery; public works contracts and construction is the worst among the sectors. 
2
  Auriol (2006) studies capture and extortion in public purchase by developing an auction theorem with 
corruption and shows that the total cost of capture is between 1.2 and 2.88 times the amount of bribe based 
on a calibration. 
3
  Tirole (1986) considers the collusion problem by introducing a principle-supervisor-agent hierarchy 
model. Laffont and Tirole (1991), Kofman and Lawarree (1993, 1996), Strausz (1997), and Kessler (2000) 
expand this framework. Applying the hierarchical collusion model, Auriol (2006) analyzes collusion in 
public construction as mentioned in footnote 3. In contrast, we attempt to consider collusion in public 
construction by using a simple Nash bargaining solution. 
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reduces the earthquake resistance, the public infrastructure may collapse stochastically 
when a major earthquake occurs. When the public infrastructure collapses, the shoddy 
construction is discovered and the business manager of the construction firm and the 
bureaucrat who had inspected the infrastructure are punished. We find that, when collusion 
is committed, earthquake resistance decreases with a large marginal cost for maintaining the 
earthquake resistance and with a large public infrastructure. Moreover, a large probability of 
earthquake occurrence and heavy punishment deter shoddy construction, but punishment 
that is too heavy may induce the business manager and the bureaucrat to escape abroad, and 
the earthquake resistance of the infrastructure worsens significantly. 
  In this study, we focus on the relationship between earthquake resistance of infrastructure 
and corruption. Bose et al. (2008) theoretically examines the impact of corruption on the 
quality of public infrastructure and empirically shows that corruption worsens the quality of 
electricity, water, and roads. Considering a majority voting model, Anbarci et al. (2005) points 
out that enforcement of high-level building codes often fails in developing countries because 
the per capita income is simply too low or there are conflicts between different segments of 
society. Rahman et al. (2017, p.796) empirically investigates whether earthquakes trigger 
political transitions and concludes that, “while not leading to a full-fledged regime transition, 
earthquake shocks open a new window of opportunity, but this is narrowed by improved 
economic conditions.” 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce our 
model of collusion, and then in Section 3, we consider the earthquake resistance of public 
infrastructure. In Section 4, we extend the model by considering the possibility that the 
business manager and the bureaucrat escape abroad before a major earthquake occurs. In 
Section 5, we provide the concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. The Model 
  We consider a simple economy consisting of two players: a business manager of a 
construction firm and a bureaucrat belonging to a government, which has placed an order for 
public works construction. The firm has already received the contract for the public project, 
such as a dam, bridge, hospital, or school. The closed bid of the public project is historically 
given in our model.4 The bureaucrat inspects the building site to make sure that the firm 
                                                  
4
  The bidding process of public purchases is also a hotbed of political corruption, as analyzed by Auriol 
(2006). However, the essential problem of shoddy construction arises from collusion, so, for simplification, 
we exclude the bidding process in our model. 
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executes the public project properly. We assume that the business manager and the 
bureaucrat can collude; the firm performs shoddy construction, and the bureaucrat condones 
it by taking a bribe. If the firm reduces the construction cost by the shoddy construction, the 
earthquake resistance of the public infrastructure erodes and the probability of the 
infrastructure’s collapse rises when a major earthquake occurs. When the building collapses, 
the crime of shoddy construction is discovered and both the business manager and the 
bureaucrat are punished. 
  The size of a public works project is denoted by X . The marginal cost of construction, 
MC , is given by 
      QMC ⋅= γ ,                                                   (1) 
where ]1,0[∈Q  is the earthquake resistance of the public infrastructure, which can be 
selectable by the firm. 1=Q  implies that the building satisfies the earthquake resistance 
standards, and we assume that the building does not collapse even when a major earthquake 
occurs. The earthquake-resistance standards need to be met in the original contract. We 
define the shoddy construction as the decrease of Q . 0>γ  represents the marginal cost for 
improving earthquake resistance.5 When a major earthquake occurs, the probability of the 
collapse of the infrastructure is 
      Qq −=1 .                                                     (2) 
The profit of the firm is XMCP )( −=π , where P  is the unit price of the construction. 
We assume that the closed contract guarantees the firm a non-negative profit even when the 
firm builds a public infrastructure that meets earthquake-resistance standards 1=Q . Thus, 
we set the price as γα )1( +=P ; 0≥α  is the markup rate. Thus, when the firm 
maintains the earthquake-resistance standards, the profit of the firm π  is 
      XXMCP αγπ =−= )( .                                        (3) 
On the other hand, when collusion is committed, the expected profit of the firm is 
      θργαθρπ qbXqqbXMCPE −−+=−−−= )()( ,                 (4) 
where b  is a bribe, )1,0(∈ρ  is the probability of a major earthquake occurrence, and 
0>θ  is the punishment when the shoddy construction is discovered.6 
  The utility function of the bureaucrat is given by 
η
BbU = , where 0>B  and )1,0(∈η . 
                                                  
5
  Because the scale of public construction X  is fixed, the marginal cost with respect to X  does not 
have any effect in our model. Thus, we omit the marginal cost for the size of public construction; we 
consider only the marginal cost of the earthquake resistance Q . 
6
  We assume that the utility function of the business manager is linear, that is, he/she obtains one unit of 
utility from one unit of profit. 
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For simplicity, we assume that the punishment for the bureaucrat is that same as that for the 
business manager. When collusion is committed, the expected utility is 
      θρη qBbEU −= .                                              (5) 
If the collusion does not hold, the utility is 
      0=U .                                                        (6) 
 
  The timing of our game is summarized as follows. 
Stage zero: The contract for the public works construction is closed. The contract is 
historically given in our model. 
Stage one: The business manager and the bureaucrat decide on whether to collude on the 
shoddy construction. 
Stage two: The firm builds the public infrastructure. 
Stage three: A major earthquake stochastically occurs. Depending on the degree of the shoddy 
construction, the public infrastructure collapses stochastically. When the building 
collapses, both the business manager and the bureaucrat are punished. 
 
 
3. The Equilibrium 
  In this section, we analyze the degree of the shoddy construction and the amount of the 
bribe. When the business manager and the bureaucrat select q  and b , respectively, there 
is a unique Nash equilibrium )0,0(),( =qb . When the Nash equilibrium holds, shoddy 
construction does not occur. This is the reference point of bargaining. From (3), (4), (5), and 
(6), the participation constraints of the bureaucrat and the business manager are, 
respectively,  
      0≥−=− θρη qBbUEU ,                                      (7.a) 
      0)( ≥−−=− bqXE ρθγππ .                                   (7.b) 
Thus, the Nash product is 
      ]log[)1(]log[ ππββ −−+−= EUEUV  
        ])log[()1(]log[ bqXqBb −−−+−= ρθγβθρβ η ,                 (8) 
where β  is the bargaining power of the bureaucrat. By the Nash bargain solution, we have 
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The results of the comparative statics are summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1 
(i) The earthquake resistance of the public infrastructure decreases with a large marginal 
















(ii) The earthquake resistance of the public infrastructure increases with a large probability 















 (iii) The earthquake resistance of the public infrastructure increases with the high 









  The first and second results are straightforward. Because Xγ  denotes the marginal 
benefit of the firm from the reduction of the earthquake resistance, the firm can save a large 
amount of construction costs by committing shoddy construction when γ  and X  are large. 
The high probability of an earthquake occurrence and heavy punishment deter shoddy 
construction. On the other hand, the third result stems from the assumption that the 
business manager is risk-neutral while the bureaucrat is risk-averse. 
 
 
4. The Extended Model 
  Proposition 1 suggests that heavy punishment improves the earthquake resistance of 
public construction. Moreover, because heavy punishment violates the participation 
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constraints (7.a) and (7.b), prohibitory punishment, including life imprisonment or death 
penalty, deters shoddy construction. However, we have the question of whether such 
punishment is always effective. Because there is normally a time interval between when the 
public infrastructure is completed and when a major earthquake occurs, the business 
manager and the bureaucrat have enough time to escape, frequently, by going abroad. In this 
case, it would be difficult to catch them. In this section, we develop the previous model by 
considering a possibility that the business manager and the bureaucrat can escape abroad 
after the public project is completed. 
  We assume that the business manager and the bureaucrat can surely escape by incurring 
flight costs 0>ψ . Moreover, for simplicity, we exclude cases in which one of them escapes 
alone. 
 
  The timing of the extended game is summarized as follows; the changes are written in 
italics. 
Stage zero: The contract of the public works construction is closed. The contract is historically 
given in our model. 
Stage one: The business manager and the bureaucrat decide on whether to collude on the 
shoddy construction. Moreover, the business manager and the bureaucrat decide on 
whether to escape if they collude and commit shoddy construction. 
Stage two: The firm builds the public infrastructure. According to the decision in stage one, 
they may escape by incurring a flight cost. 
Stage three: A major earthquake stochastically occurs. In this case, depending on the degree 
of the shoddy construction, the public infrastructure collapses stochastically. When the 
infrastructure collapses, and when the business manager and the bureaucrat do not 
escape in stage two, both of them are punished. 
 
  When the business manager and the bureaucrat commit shoddy construction and escape 
after the construction is completed, the utility of the bureaucrat and the profit of the firm are, 
respectively, 
      ψη −⋅= bBU
~
,                                              (11.a) 
      ψγσγαπ −−++= bXq])([~ .                                  (11.b) 
Note that we assume that they can surely escape by incurring the flight cost. When collusion 
is not committed, their profit and utility are the same as in (6) and (3). The participation 
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constraints in the case of an escape are, respectively, 
      0
~
≥−=− ψηBbUU ,                                         (12.a) 
      0~ ≥−−=− ψγππ bXq .                                      (12.b) 
Thus, the Nash product in this case is 




ππββ −−+−= UUV  
        ]log[)1(]log[ ψγβψβ η −−−+−= bXqBb .                     (13) 
In the same manner as in the previous section, we maximize (13) with respect to b  and q . 
Straightforwardly, we have a corner solution of the probability of collapse as 1
** =q , that is, 
the earthquake resistance of the public infrastructure is the minimum and the infrastructure 
surely collapses when a major earthquake occurs. The equilibrium bribe 
**b  must satisfy 
the following equation: 
      0)1())(()()]1([
1**** =−−−−−+ − ψβψγβηββη ηη bXBbB .         (14) 
To get an analytical solution, we assume that only the bureaucrat has bargaining power, that 
is, 1=β .7 Substituting it into (14), we have  
      ψγ −= Xb ** .                                                 (15) 
From (12.a), (12.b), (15), and 1
** =q , the participation constraints are changed to  
      0)()(
~ ** ≥−−=− ψψγ ηXBUbU ,                              (16.a) 
      0~ =−ππ .                                                  (16.b) 
  Next, we consider the condition of whether the bureaucrat and the business manager 
escape after the public infrastructure with shoddy construction is completed. For comparison, 
we also set 1=β  in the case that the business manager and the bureaucrat do not escape. 
Substituting (9), (10), and 1=β  into (7.a) and (7.b), we have 
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BUbEU ,                    (17.a) 
      0=−ππE .                                                 (17.b) 
In the case of 1=β , when the collusion does not hold, the utility of the bureaucrat is zero, 
that is, 0=U . Thus, this is equivalent to the problem that the bureaucrat maximizes 
his/her utility subject to the participation constraint of the business manager. In this case, 
the bureaucrat takes all the rent.8 
  There are potentially three kinds of equilibria: (i) shoddy construction with flight (shoddy 
construction is committed and the bureaucrat and the business manager escape), (ii) shoddy 
construction without flight (shoddy construction is committed and the bureaucrat and the 
business manager do not escape), and (iii) no shoddy construction (shoddy construction is not 
committed). Figure 1 illustrates the regions in which an equilibrium occurs. These regions 
are characterized by following equations: 
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.                          (20) 
The detailed derivation of Figure 1 is given in the Appendix. Note that an increase in escape 
cost ψ  shifts (18) to the right and (20) upward. In addition, an increase in the probability of 
an earthquake occurrence ρ  flattens (19) and (20). We summarize the results from Figure 1 
in Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2 
(i) Shoddy construction with flight tends to occur when the punishment θ  is heavy and the 
marginal benefit of shoddy construction Xγ  is large. 
(ii) Shoddy construction without flight tends to occur when θ  is small and Xγ  is large. 
                                                  
8
  The assumption that one player takes all the rent is standard in considering the political collusion 
problem, for example, Auriol (2006) and Bac and Bag (2006). 
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(iii) No shoddy construction tends to occur when θ  is large and Xγ  is small. 
(iv) A large escape cost ψ  curbs shoddy construction with flight but may raise shoddy 
construction without flight. 
(v) A large probability of an earthquake occurrence ρ  curbs shoddy construction without 
flight but may raise shoddy construction with flight. 
 
  Light punishment cannot repress shoddy construction. However, when the marginal 
benefit from shoddy contraction is large relative to the escape cost, heavy punishment fails to 
curb shoddy construction. Whenever shoddy construction makes a large profit for the 
business manager and the bureaucrat, heavy punishment leads them to escape after the 
public infrastructure with the shoddy construction is completed. When the business manager 
and the bureaucrat collude and decide to escape abroad, the earthquake resistance of the 
infrastructure worsens to a dangerously low level. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
  Shoddy construction that stems from collusive ties between construction firms and 
bureaucrats is a serious problem, especially, in less developed countries. Several empirical 
studies suggest that shoddy construction raises earthquake mortality. Introducing a simple 
Nash bargaining solution, we have shown that political corruption between business 
managers of construction firms and bureaucrats reduces the earthquake resistance of public 
infrastructure. When the size of the public works project is large, the marginal cost for 
increasing earthquake resistance is large and/or the probability of an earthquake occurrence 
is small, and collusion between them tends to occur and the earthquake resistance of the 
infrastructure decreases. Punishment can curb shoddy construction, but heavy punishment 
may induce the business manager and the bureaucrat to escape. In this case, the earthquake 
resistance of the public infrastructure decreases to a dangerously low level.  
  Damage from shoddy construction is inestimable because the infrastructure kills many 
people when a major earthquake occurs. However, when the benefit from the reduction of 
earthquake resistance is large, punishment alone would not repress collusion between 
business managers of construction firms and bureaucrats who inspect building sites. While 
light punishment is not enough to deter corruption, heavy punishment induces them to 
escape after the infrastructure with shoddy construction is completed. An important aspect of 
eradicating shoddy construction may be outside independent inspector. Moreover, Bac and 
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Bag (2006) develop a model with a principal-supervisor-agent hierarchy by introducing an 
outside detector, such as media. The detection of corruption by outsiders may curb shoddy 
construction. Alternatively, a policy that gives an incentive to whistle-blowers on construction 




  If UbU >)(
~ **
, the bureaucrat prefers (i) to (iii). If UbEU >)( * , the bureaucrat prefers 
(ii) to (iii). If )()(
~ *** bEUbU > , the bureaucrat prefers (i) to (ii). From (16.a), we have (18); 
UbU >)(
~ **
 holds in the right region of (18). From (17.a), we have (19); UbEU >)( *  
holds in the upper area of (19). Point A is the intersection of (18) with (19); the coordinates at 













/,/, ρψψψψθγ ηη BBX . In the northeast area of point A, 
)()(
~ *** bEUUbU >>  holds; (i) shoddy construction with flight emerges. In the southwest 
area between (18) and (19), )(
~
)( *** bUUbEU >>  holds, and (ii) shoddy construction 
without flight emerges. In the northwest area between (18) and (19), (iii) no shoddy 
construction emerges. On the other hand, in the southeast area between (18) and (19), both 
UbU >)(
~ **
 and UbEU >)( *  are achieved. Thus, we derive the condition that implies 
)()(
~ *** bEUbU >  even when (18) and (19) hold. From (16.a) and (17.a), we have (20); 
)()(
~ *** bEUbU >  holds in upper area of (20). We find that (20) passes point A. Moreover, 
(20) has a positive slope and the slope of (20) is smaller than (19) even in the right area of (18). 
Thus, we find that UbUbEU >> )(
~
)( ***  holds in the lower area of (20) and 
UbEUbU >> )()(
~ ***
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